











Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/150072                                                                           
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk. 
 
Running head: CIDS   1 
 
Running head: CIDS 
 
Explaining the association between repetition priming and source memory: No evidence for a 
contribution of recognition or fluency 
 
Nicholas Lange 
University of Warwick 
Christopher J. Berry 





Nicholas Lange, Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Christopher J. 
Berry, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth. 
This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ES/N009916/1). 
Raw data and analysis scripts of all experiments is available at https://osf.io/r254g/ . 
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Nicholas Lange, 
Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK. 
lange.nk@gmail.com.
CIDS    2 
 
Abstract 
In a conjoint memory task (measuring repetition priming, recognition memory, source 
memory), items recognized as previously studied and receiving correct source decisions also 
tend to show a greater magnitude of the repetition priming effect. These associations have been 
explained as arising from a single memory system or signal, rather than multiple distinct ones 
(Lange, Berry, & Hollins, 2020). In the present work, we examine whether the association 
between priming and source memory can alternatively be explained as being driven by 
recognition or fluency. We first reproduced the basic priming-source association (Experiment 1). 
In Experiments 2 and 3, we found that the association persisted even when the task was modified 
so that overt and covert recognition judgments were precluded. In Experiment 4, the association 
was again present even though fluency (as measured by identification response time) could not 
influence the source decision, although the association was notably weaker. These findings 
suggest that the association between priming and source memory is not attributable to a 
contribution of recognition or fluency; instead, the findings are consistent with a single-system 
account in which a common memory signal drives responding. 
 
Keywords: source memory; repetition priming, recognition memory 
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Memory can be expressed in a variety of ways, such as a change in identification or 
detection of an item due to previous exposure to the item (long-term repetition priming) or the 
ability to determine whether an item had been encountered before in a particular context 
(recognition memory). Prominent theories explain these particular phenomena as being driven by 
distinct memory systems, signals or processes. Under some theoretical accounts, priming is 
driven by an implicit (unconscious or nondeclarative) memory system, whereas recognition 
memory is driven by a functionally and neurally distinct explicit (conscious or declarative) 
memory system (e.g., Squire, 1994, 2004, 2009; Squire & Dede, 2015; Tulving & Schacter, 
1990). This multiple systems account of memory is pervasive in psychology textbooks as the 
default model of memory (e.g. Baddeley, Eysenck, & Anderson, 2014), and independent 
memory systems are still used to explain differential memory performance (e.g. Henson, 
Campbell, Davis, Taylor, Emery, et al., 2016). Evidence for a multiple systems theory of 
memory is based on functional and neural dissociations between tasks (e.g. Craik, Moscovitch, 
& McDowd, 1994; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Schacter, Wig, & Stevens, 2007; Staresina, Duncan, 
& Davachi, 2011; Squire, 2009), though there is evidence challenging these findings and/or 
inferences (e.g. Addante, 2015; Berry, Kessels, Wester, & Shanks, 2014;  Buchner & Wippich, 
2000; Dunn, 2003; Lukatela, Moreno, Eaton, & Turvey, 2007; Meier, Theiler, Burgi, & Perrig, 
2009; Mulligan & Osborn, 2009; Ostergaard, 1992; Poldrack, 1996; Thakral, Kensinger & 
Slotnick, 2016). 
The counterview to the multiple systems model of memory is that memory expression in 
different tasks, such as priming and recognition, is based on the same underlying memory signal. 
Under such an account, higher memory strength for an item should be simultaneously associated 
with greater priming and higher recognition memory. Berry, Shanks, Speekenbrink and Henson 
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(2012) tested this account using a conjoint priming and recognition memory paradigm where, for 
each item at test, participants were asked to identify a word as it clarified over a mask (to provide 
a measure of priming) and give a recognition judgment on a scale of certain-new to certain-old. 
In line with a single-system model, they found that identification for items judged old was faster 
than that of items judged new; the priming effect, as measured across all studied items, was 
greater than the priming effect for items not recognized, and identification RTs (response times) 
tended to decrease as recognition confidence increased. This has since been replicated many 
times and confirmed in formal modeling (e.g. Berry, Henson, & Shanks, 2006; Berry, Kessels, 
Wester, & Shanks, 2014; Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2008a; Berry, Shanks, & Henson, 2008b; 
Berry, Shanks, Li, Rains, & Henson, 2010; Berry, Ward, & Shanks, 2017; Mazancieux, Pandiani 
& Moulin, 2020; Ward, Berry, & Shanks, 2013; see Shanks & Berry, 2012, for a review). 
However, under some accounts of recognition memory, recognition memory itself is 
driven by two processes: recollection and familiarity (e.g. Yonelinas, 2002). While recollection 
relies on explicit retrieval of memory, familiarity is often argued to be driven by repetition 
priming (e.g. Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). This means that the association of priming 
and recognition memory could be driven by this shared, implicit component and leaves the 
question of whether the same memory signal can drive performance in priming and a memory 
task that is traditionally seen as reliant on explicit memory. 
In Lange et al. (2019) we therefore extended the behavioral and modeling work of Berry 
et al. (2012) to source memory. In source memory tasks, participants are asked to retrieve the 
exact context an item was studied in, such as whether it was shown in red or blue font, on the top 
or the bottom of the screen, or on a beach or woods background. These tasks cannot be solved by 
relying on familiarity but require the explicit retrieval of memorial information (but see Taylor & 
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Henson, 2012; Diana, Yonelinas & Ranganath, 2008). In this extended task, at study participants 
were shown words at the top or the bottom of the screen. At test, participants first identified an 
item as it clarified across a mask, then gave a recognition confidence rating, followed by a source 
confidence rating. We replicated findings of the association of priming and recognition memory 
and observed the analogous association of priming and source memory: items with correct 
source decisions tended to also have faster identification RTs (for similar findings using a recall 
task as the source memory task, see Mazancieux et al., 2020, Exp 1). These results are consistent 
with a single memory signal underlying responding where greater memory strength of an item is 
more likely associated with greater priming, correct ‘old’ recognition judgements, and correct 
source judgements. 
While the core assumption of a single memory signal or multiple independent memory 
signals is central to the predictions about the association of those memory tasks, auxiliary 
assumptions about the response mapping describes how responding in one task changes with 
responding in another. In the standard response mapping, responses are assumed to be made 
independently of one another. For the association of priming and source memory, for example, 
this means that the magnitude of the priming effect should monotonically increase from ‘sure-
(incorrect source decision)’ to ‘sure-(correct source decision)’.1   However, in all experiments in 
Lange et al. (2019), priming tended to be highest at both end points of the rating scale and lowest 
at the mid-point of the scale. In other words, priming increased with increasing confidence in the 
source decision, regardless of whether that decision was correct or incorrect.  
Given source memory ratings followed recognition ratings in our task, we considered 
whether this unexpected pattern in the association of priming and source memory was due to the 
recognition ratings that preceded the source confidence ratings, i.e., that recognition and source 
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memory responses were not made independently. It is well-established that there is some 
dependency between source- and recognition-ratings, such that source decisions made with high 
confidence are more likely when recognition decisions are made with high confidence (e.g. 
Hautus et al. 2008; Starns, Pazzaglia, Rotello, Hautus & Macmillan, 2013), and that this is a 
consequence of more than just a shared memory signal (Starns & Ksander, 2016). Models of 
recognition and source memory incorporate this by allowing source decision criteria or response 
mapping to change with the recognition rating (e.g. Hautus et al. 2008, Klauer & Kellen, 2010; 
Onyper, Zhang, & Howard, 2010). When we adapted the response mapping to include the 
dependency between these responses, the single-system model of our conjoint memory tasks 
captured the finding that correct source decisions are associated with greater priming than 
incorrect source decisions overall, and that priming increases with source confidence regardless 
of whether the source response was correct.  
One possibility is that the better prediction of the model with changed response mapping 
is evidence that the underlying process that gives rise to the specific characteristics of the 
association between priming and source memory is the decisional dependence of source memory 
ratings on preceding recognition memory ratings. In the present paper, we sought to test this 
empirically. If source memory confidence ratings change with recognition confidence ratings, 
removing recognition confidence ratings should remove that decisional bias. Then, overall, 
correct source decisions should still be associated with greater priming than incorrect source 
decisions (in line with the core assumption of the single system model), but priming should now 
gradually increase with increasing confidence in the correct source decision. Experiment 1 is a 
replication of Experiment 2 in Lange et al. (2019) to re-establish the previously observed pattern 
of the association of priming and source memory. We then sought to determine whether the 
CIDS    7 
 
association would persist even when overt (Experiment 2) and covert (Experiment 3) recognition 
judgments were precluded. In Experiment 4, by measuring priming and source decisions in 
separate, rather than interleaved phases, we tested whether the priming-source association would 
persist under conditions where other factors, like the fluency of identification, would not 
influence the source decision. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. 36 individuals (seven male; M age = 24.20, SD = 9.52) took part in the 
experiment for payment of £8. This sample size provided a power of 0.8 to detect a medium-
sized effect in a repeated measures design with two levels (i.e., a Cohen’s dz approximately equal 
to 0.48) based on calculations for a pilot study. We used the same sample size in each subsequent 
experiment. Participants in each experiment were recruited using a University of Plymouth 
participation pool. Ethics were approved by the University of Plymouth ethics board. All 
participants provided informed consent prior to participating in the experiment. 
Materials. The stimulus pool consisted of 384 four-letter low frequency words, selected 
from the Medical Research Council psycholinguistic database (Coltheart, 1981). The frequency 
of occurrence ranged from 1-13 per million, and there were no concreteness or imageability 
constraints. Archaic and colloquial terms were excluded. For each participant, 176 words were 
randomly assigned to be the old stimuli, another 176 words were selected to be the new stimuli, 
and a further 32 words were selected to be the stimuli appearing on primacy and recency buffer 
trials in the study phase. 
Procedure. At the beginning of the experiment, participants completed six practice trials 
of the continuous identification task (CID; Berry et al., 2012; Feustel et al., 1983; Lange et al., 
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2019; Stark & McClelland, 2000) in order to familiarize themselves with the task prior to the 
experimental trials. The CID procedure was the same as that of Lange et al. (2019). On each CID 
trial a single word was flashed for longer and longer durations, becoming clearer over time. 
Participants were instructed to press the Enter key as soon as they were sure that they could 
identify the word correctly. Accuracy and speed were emphasized in the task instructions. At the 
start of each trial a fixation mask “####” was presented in 24-point Courier font for 1,000 ms. 
Next, the word was presented in 20-point Courier font for 16.7 ms (one screen refresh at 60 Hz). 
The mask was then presented for 233.3 ms, forming a 250 ms presentation block. There were 
thirty 250 ms presentation blocks. The stimulus duration increased by 16.7 ms on each alternate 
block, and the mask was always presented for the remainder of the 250 ms block. Thus, each 
CID trial was potentially 7,500 ms long, but could be terminated prematurely by the participant 
pressing the Enter key. When the Enter key was pressed, the mask was then re-presented for 16.7 
ms. Next, a white outlined box was presented that indicated to the participant that he or she must 
type the word on the keyboard. Key presses were displayed in the box. Participants were told to 
press Enter after typing the word to advance to the next trial. 
Study phase. Participants were told that they would see words presented below or above 
the center of the screen for a brief duration and that their task was to remember the location of 
each word for a later test. Participants completed eight study-test blocks, which were identical 
except that the stimuli in each block were unique. At the start of each study block a “+”-fixation 
was presented for 500 ms in the center of the screen. The words were presented for 2 s each, with 
half of them presented 0.9 cm below the central fixation point (i.e., subtending a vertical visual 
angle of approximately 0.69°, from a viewing distance of approximately 75 cm) and the other 
half 0.9 cm above the fixation point. The inter-stimulus interval was 100 ms. The assignment of 
CIDS    9 
 
words to the location and the order of presentation was randomized across participants. 
Participants completed 26 study trials per block, with the first and last two trials in each block 
designated as primacy and recency buffer trials. The buffer stimuli were not presented in the 
experiment again. 
Test phase. Next, instructions were presented for the first CID-RS (i.e., CID with 
Recognition and Source judgments) test phase. Participants were told that they would again 
complete identification trials, and that some of the words were from the previous study block and 
some were novel. They were told that they must decide whether they thought the word was new 
(i.e., not shown previously) or old (i.e. studied) after each identification, and to indicate whether 
it was previously shown at the bottom or the top of the screen. They were informed to make that 
location judgment even for items they indicated were new and to guess if unsure. Participants 
were told that half of the words would be new and half would be old, and that half of the old 
words were presented at the bottom of the screen and half were presented at the top. There were 
44 trials in each test block, composed of 22 old and 22 new items. On each trial a word was 
presented in the center of the screen using the same CID procedure as in the practice trials. After 
participants made their identification, the word was replaced by a recognition probe (“Is the 
word New or Old?”) and a rating scale (“1 = sure new, 2 = probably new, 3 = guess new, 4 = 
guess old, 5 = probably old, 6 = sure old”). After participants made their recognition judgment a 
source memory probe was presented (“Was the word presented at the bottom or top?”) with a 
rating scale (“1 = sure bottom, 2 = probably bottom, 3 = guess bottom, 4 = guess top, 5 = 
probably top, 6 = sure top”). Participants used the number keys 1 through 6 on the main part of a 
QWERTY keyboard for the recognition judgments and the number keys on the number pad for 
the source memory judgement. Stickers were added to the number pad with up arrows indicating 
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the ‘top’ response and down arrows indicating the ‘bottom’ response. After making their source 
memory judgment, a prompt was presented instructing participants to press the Enter key to start 
the next trial. On completion of the test block, participants were presented with the next study 
block. On completion of the final test block, the experiment terminated. 
Initial screening of identification trials. In this experiment and subsequent ones, a trial 
was not included in the analysis if a word was misidentified during the identification phase of a 
trial or identification responses were too fast or too slow. Identification responses were corrected 
for minor typographical errors (e.g., where a number or a symbol was typed after the correctly 
typed word). One participant was excluded at this stage because they did not attempt to identify 
any words in the first study-test block. Overall, the proportion of misidentified trials after 
correction for typographical errors was low (M = 3.05%, SD = 2.58), as was the proportion of 
trials on which participants did not provide a response (M = 0.19%, SD = 0.78). The proportion 
of trials on which the identification RT was less than 200 ms or greater than three standard 
deviations above the mean identification RT (within participant) was also low (M = 1.22% of 
trials, SD = 0.49). Following Lange et al. (2019), these four types of trials were not analyzed 
further. This left a sufficient number of valid trials for all individuals (M = 95.54, SD = 2.52, Min 
= 88.07%). 
Measures. All analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2019). For all relevant 
statistical comparisons, we excluded participants listwise if they had missing data in any cell of 
that analysis. ANOVAs were calculated using aov_car function in the afex package (Singmann, 
Bolker, Westfall, Aust & Ben-Shachar, 2020), with posthoc contrasts calculated with emmeans 
(Lenth, 2020). Degrees of freedom were corrected for violation of sphericity where necessary 
using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction. An alpha level of .05 was used for all statistical 
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analyses and all t-tests were two-tailed. We also conducted equivalent Bayesian analyses, and 
report Bayes Factors (BF) for all reported frequentist tests, using the BayesFactor package 
(Morey & Rouder, 2018), with the package’s default priors for all tests. We report the following 
effect sizes: ηP
2 for ANOVAs, Cohen’s dz (dz; mean difference of two dependent measures, 
divided by the average standard deviation of the difference of the two measures) for t tests. Trials 
were aggregated across study-test blocks for all analyses. 
The priming effect was calculated as the mean identification RT for new items minus the 
mean identification RT for old items. Recognition discrimination was measured with d′ 
(henceforth referred to as recognition d′), which is calculated as z[p(“old”| old)] – z[p(“old”| 
new)], where p(“old”| old) = (number of hits + 0.5) / (number of old items + 1)  and p(“old”| 
new) = (number of false alarms + 0.5) / (number of new items + 1), following Snodgrass and 
Corwin (1988). The pattern of results for Pr, which is the measure of discriminability in the two-
high threshold model and is calculated as p(“old”| old) - p(“old”| new), was the same, so we only 
report recognition d′ throughout.  Recognition response bias was measured with c (henceforth 
referred to as recognition c), which is calculated as -0.5 * (z[p(“old”| old)] + z[p(“old”| new)]). 
Source discrimination was measured with d′ (henceforth referred to as source d′). For this 
measure, source-top items were arbitrarily designated as targets and source-bottom items as non-
targets; thus, source d′ = z[p(“top”| top)] – z[p(“top”| bottom)], where p(“top”| top) = (number of 
correct top responses + 0.5) / (number of source-top items + 1) and p(“top”| bottom) = (number 
of incorrect top responses + 0.5) / (number of source-bottom items + 1)). The pattern of results 
for source accuracy—calculated as (number of “top”| top items + number of “bottom”| bottom 
items) / number of old items—was the same, so only the former is reported. Source bias was 
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measured with c (henceforth referred to as source c) and calculated as -0.5*(z[p(“top”| top)] + 
z[p(“top”| bottom)]). 
For the analysis of identification RTs classified according to source confidence ratings, 
responses were collapsed across source-top and source-bottom items. Source ratings 3, 2 and 1 
for source-bottom items and 4, 5, and 6 for source-top items constituted correct source decisions 
with increasing certainty of response, while source ratings 4, 5 and 6 for source-bottom items 
and 3, 2 and 1 for source-top items constituted incorrect source decisions. 
Reliability of measures. Prior research has shown that it is important to consider the 
relative reliabilities of direct and indirect memory tasks when comparing task performance 
(Buchner & Wippich, 2000). Accordingly, split-half correlations were used to determine the 
reliability of the priming, recognition and source measures in all experiments. To calculate these, 
we first split the data from each participant into odd and even numbered trials and then 
calculated the priming effect, recognition d′ and source d′ in each half. The split-half correlations 
were then given as the Pearson correlation between performance in each half across participants. 
In Experiment 1, these were large and significant (priming, r(33) = .90, p < .001, BF = 1.94 × 
109; recognition d′, r(33) = .90, p < .001, BF = 3.55 × 109; source d′, r(33) = .81, p < .001, BF = 
7.70 × 105). 
Results 
Considering first overall levels of memory performance, the priming effect, recognition 
d′ and source d′ all exceeded chance (0) (M priming = 247 ms, SE = 34, t(34) = 7.17, p < .001, d 
= 1.22, BF = 5.11 × 105; M recognition d′  = 1.23, SE = 0.10, t(34) = 12.02, p < .001, d = 2.03, 
BF = 8.61 × 1010; M source d′ = 0.80, SE = 0.11, t(34) = 7.48, p < .001, d = 1.26, BF = 1.16 × 
106). Table 1 shows the mean identification RT for new and old items, and also the mean hit rate 
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and false alarm rate for recognition and source decisions. Neither recognition nor source 
responding was biased overall (recognition c = -0.04, SE = 0.04, t(34) = 0.98, p = .33, d = 0.17, 
BF = 0.28; source c = 0.01, SE = 0.05), t(34) = 0.11, p = .91, d = 0.02, BF = 0.18).  
There was evidence for correlations between these overall measures, though this was 
only substantial for the association of recognition and source memory (priming and recognition 
d′, r(34) = .35, p = .041, BF = 2.32; priming and source d′, r(34) = .33, p = .056, BF = 1.84; 
recognition d′ and source d′, r(34) = .82, p < .001, BF = 1.82 × 106).  
As in Lange et al. (2019), we expected associations between priming and source memory 
to be evident when broken down according to the source decision. We consider two aspects of 
the data: 1) the difference in the magnitude of the priming effect for items with correct and 
incorrect source decisions, and 2) how the priming effect varies with participants’ confidence in 
their source decision. 
First, the priming effect for items with correct source decisions was significantly greater 
than for items with incorrect source decisions (M difference = 71 ms, SE = 24), t(34) = 3.00, p < 
.005, d = 0.51, BF = 7.76 (see the left-hand side of Figure 1A). This difference was consistent 
across individuals, being present in 69% of participants. 
Second, we examined identification RTs for correct and incorrect source decisions across 
participants’ confidence. Identification RTs tended to decrease (i.e., the priming effect was 
greater) as confidence in the source decision increased, as is shown in the right-hand side of 
Figure 1A. This trend was confirmed in a 3 (source confidence: guess, probably, sure) × 2 
(source decision: correct, incorrect) repeated measures ANOVA, which yielded a significant 
main effect of source confidence, F(1.63, 48.77) = 11.62, MSE = 70424, p < .001, ηP
2
 = .28, BF 
= 9.79 × 102. Four participants could not be included in this ANOVA because they had zero 
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responses for particular cells of the analysis (hence N = 31 for this analysis). Post-hoc analyses 
confirmed a significant linear trend, t(43) = 4.82, p < .001, with higher-level trends not 
significant (p > .89). Source decisions given a high confidence rating were associated with a 
faster identification than source decisions given a low confidence rating, p < .001 (the remaining 
comparisons, Bonferroni-adjusted, p > .043). There was no main effect of source decision, F(1, 
30) = 1.14, MSE = 32431, p = .29, ηP
2 = .04, BF = 0.22, or interaction, F(2, 60) = 1.16, MSE = 
40521, p  = .32, ηP
2 = .04, BF = 0.23. 
Briefly, in this experiment, we also replicated the association of priming and recognition 
memory shown in Berry et al. (2012) and Lange et al. (2019). For old items, identification was 
faster for items judged old than items judged new (M difference = 210 ms, SE = 51, t(34) = 4.15, 
p < .001, dz = 0.70, BF = 127) and identification RTs decreased with increasing recognition 
confidence (p < .001, though p < .015 for quadratic and cubic trends).  For new items, there was 
no clear evidence for an effect of fluency (i.e., M difference in identification RT to new items 
judged old and new = 48 ms, SE = 25, t(34) = 1.95, p = .060, dz = 0.33, BF = 0.98) though 
overall identification RTs decreased with increasing recognition confidence (p < .001, all higher 
level contrasts: p > .050). 
Discussion 
These results are consistent with those of Lange et al. (2019), showing greater priming 
for correct than incorrect source decisions, and greater priming with increasing confidence 
regardless of the source decision. We also replicated the now well-established association of 
priming and recognition memory in this paradigm (e.g. Berry et al., 2012). Having established 
the association between priming and source, we now turn to test if recognition confidence ratings 
are central to the nature of this association. This is the theoretical assumption underlying the 
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adapted response mapping in the single-system model in Lange et al. (2019). In all following 
experiments, we will not elicit overt recognition ratings from participants. In addition, in 
Experiment 3 and 4, we will also limit covert recognition judgments, i.e., judgments of an item’s 
oldness in the absence of an instruction to do so, by only showing old items at test. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we removed the requirement to make overt recognition judgements at 
test. To be clear, under a single system account of performance in both tasks, the association 
between priming and source memory is predicted to persist even when recognition confidence 
ratings are not made. Thus, identification RTs for items with correct source decisions should still 
tend to be shorter than those of items with incorrect source decisions. However, if the nature of 
the association is driven by the recognition confidence ratings preceding source memory 
judgments, as formally modelled in Lange et al. (2019), we expect that the removal of 
recognition confidence judgments from the test phase will eliminate this influence. Then 
identification RTs should monotonically decrease from certain incorrect to certain correct source 
judgements, consistent with a single system account with linear decision bounds (i.e., a standard 
response mapping in which source ratings are independent of recognition ratings).  
Method 
Participants. 36 individuals (ten male; M age = 23.00, SD = 4.11) took part in the 
experiment for payment of £8.  
Materials and Procedure. Materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1, bar 
the following changes. Critically, we removed recognition judgements from the test phase. At 
test, for each trial participants were first asked to identify a word in the identification task, 
followed by judging whether it had been presented at the top or the bottom of the screen. In the 
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instructions, participants were still told that half the items at test were old and half were new, and 
that half the old items had been presented at top and half at the bottom of the screen. In contrast 
to Experiment 1, participants gave their source ratings using the number keys in the main part of 
a QWERTY keyboard (as in the experiments in Lange et al., 2019). 
Initial screening of identification trials and reliability of measures. The number of 
valid trials was on average M = 93.97% (SD = 3.51, Min = 84.38) after excluding trials with no 
identification response (M = 0.03%, SD = 0.09), misidentified trials (M = 4.68%, SD = 3.38) and 
trials with identification RTs less than 200ms or greater than three standard deviations above 
mean identification RT (M = 1.32%, SD = 0.62). Split-half correlations indicated that both 
priming (r(34) = .72, p < .001, BF = 1.21 × 104) and source d′ (r(34) = .88, p < .001, BF = 7.44 
× 108) were reliable. 
Results 
The priming effect and source d′ exceeded chance (0) (M priming = 248 ms, SE = 30, 
t(35) = 8.33, p < .001, d = 1.39, BF = 1.40 × 107; M source d′ = 0.88, SE = 0.15, t(35) = 6.02, p 
< .001, d = 1.00, BF = 2.34 × 104). Table 1 shows the mean identification RT for new and old 
items, and also the mean hit rate and false alarm rate for source decisions. Source responding 
was not biased overall (source c = 0.03, SE = 0.03), t(35) = 0.90, p = .37, d = 0.15, BF = 0.26. 
Across participants, the priming effect (in ms) was significantly correlated with source d′, r(34) = 
.39, p = .018, BF = 4.24. 
As in Experiment 1, we are concerned with the association of priming and source 
memory when broken down according to the type of response. First, the priming effect for items 
with correct source decisions was significantly greater than for items with incorrect source 
decisions (M difference = 82 ms, SE = 21), t(35) = 3.82, p < .001, d = 0.64, BF = 55.68 (see the 
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left-hand side of Figure 1A). This difference was present in 72% of participants. Second, the 3 
(source confidence: guess, probably, sure) × 2 (source decision: correct, incorrect) repeated 
measures ANOVA showed a main effect of source confidence, F(1.49, 43.18) = 11.86, MSE = 
95936, p < .001, ηP
2
 = .29, BF = 2.16 × 10
3.  Six participants could not be included in this 
ANOVA because they had zero responses for particular cells of the analysis (hence N = 30 for 
this analysis). Post-hoc analyses confirmed a significant linear trend, t(58) = 4.74, p < .001, with 
higher-level trends not significant (p > .32). Indeed, source decisions given a high confidence 
rating were associated with a faster identification than source decisions given a medium 
confidence, p = .006, or low confidence rating, p < .001. The main effect of source decision was 
not significant, F(1, 29) = 2.26, MSE = 67176, p = .14, ηP
2 = .07, BF = 0.40. The Source 
Confidence × Source Decision interaction was absent, F(1.54, 44.57) = 1.06, MSE = 77951, p  = 
.34, ηP
2 = .04, BF = 0.22. 
Discussion 
The association between priming and source memory did not change with the removal of 
recognition confidence ratings. As expected, correct source decisions were associated with a 
greater magnitude of priming than incorrect source decisions. However, we expected that if the 
qualitative pattern of the association of priming and source memory across source confidence is 
affected by recognition confidence ratings, as implied by the adapted response mapping, then 
this pattern should change if participants do not give recognition confidence ratings. This was 
not the case. It is possible that this is because participants still engaged in a process of 
recognition for each item despite not being required to. Given that participants are presented with 
some old and some new items at test, they may have still assessed the overall strength of the item 
before making their source decision (i.e. made a covert recognition assessment). Accordingly, 
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Experiment 3 repeated Experiment 2 except that only studied items were presented at test and 
participants were told this fact, removing the need for them to make any covert recognition 
judgment at test. 
Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. 36 individuals (five male; M age = 21.67, SD = 5.12) took part in the 
experiment for partial course credit. Participants in each experiment were recruited using the 
University of Plymouth participation pool. 
Materials and Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 2, bar one change. 
At test, participants were only shown items from the study phase, that is, no new items were 
presented. During the instructions of the test phase they were informed that they would only see 
old items at test. For eight study-test blocks, participants were therefore shown 22 old items at 
test. The remainder of instructions and procedure remained the same. For every word shown at 
test, they first identified the word in a CID task (providing identification RT) and subsequently 
rated how confident they were that the word had been shown at the top or bottom of the screen 
on a six-point rating scale using the number 1 through 6 on the main part of a QWERTY 
keyboard. 
Initial screening of identification trials and reliability of measures. The number of 
valid trials was on average M = 96.37% (SD = 2.51, Min = 86.93) after excluding trials with no 
identification response (M = 0.02%, SD = 0.09), misidentified trials (M = 2.32%, SD = 2.46) and 
trials with identification RTs less than 200 ms or greater than three standard deviations above 
mean identification RT (M = 1.29%, SD = 6.87). Since only old items were presented at test, we 
cannot calculate an overall priming effect as a contrast of identification RT for old and new 
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items. Source memory, as measured by source d′, was reliable, as indicated by the split-half 
correlation, r(34) = .89, p < .001, BF = 1.42 × 109. 
Results 
Overall, source d′ exceeded chance (0), M source d′ = 1.36, SE = 0.15, t(35) = 8.84, p < 
.001, d = 1.47, BF = 5.46 × 107. Table 1 shows the mean identification RT for old items, and also 
the mean hit rate and false alarm rate for source decisions. Source responding was not biased 
overall (source c = 0.01, SE = 0.02), t(35) = 0.32, p = .75, d = 0.05, BF = 0.19. 
Correct source decisions were associated with a faster identification than incorrect source 
decisions (M difference = 173 ms, SE = 30), t(35) = 5.76, p < .001, d = 0.96, BF = 1.12 × 104 
(see the left-hand side of Figure 1B). This difference was consistent across individuals, being 
present in 86% of participants. Regarding identification RTs for correct and incorrect source 
decisions across participants’ confidence, the pattern in the 3 (source confidence: guess, 
probably, sure) × 2 (source decision: correct, incorrect) repeated measures ANOVA was the 
same as in previous experiments. Three participants could not be included in this ANOVA 
because they had zero responses for particular cells of the analysis (hence N = 33 for this 
analysis). There was a significant main effect of source confidence, F(1.65, 52.71) = 44.37, MSE 
= 54985, p < .001, ηP
2
 = .58, BF = 7.22 × 10
15. Post-hoc analyses confirmed a significant linear 
trend, t(64) = 9.18, p < .001, with the quadratic trend also significant (p = .04). Source decisions 
given a high confidence rating were associated with a faster identification than source decisions 
given a medium or low confidence ratings, ps < .001, and source decisions given a medium 
confidence rating were associated with faster identification than source decisions given a low 
confidence rating, p < .001. The main effect of source decision was not significant, F(1, 32) = 
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1.89, MSE = 30833, p = .18, ηP
2 = .06, BF = 0.24, neither was the Source Confidence × Source 
Decision interaction, F(2, 64) = 3.07, MSE = 28641, p  = .053, ηP
2 = .09, BF = 0.64. 
Discussion 
The pattern of results in Experiment 3 was near-identical to the one in Experiment 2. 
Overall, correct source decisions were associated with more priming than incorrect source 
decisions, and priming increased with source confidence regardless of the source decision.  This 
pattern is consistent with a single-system model with the adapted response mapping. However, 
the adapted response mapping is based on recognition confidence ratings influencing source 
memory confidence ratings. With both overt and covert recognition judgments removed in 
Experiments 2 and 3, this process cannot be driving the observed association. One possibility is 
that the perceived speed of identification in the priming task  affected source ratings. For 
example, in the absence of recognition confidence ratings, perceived fast identifications in the 
CID task may have resulted in more confident source decisions than perceived slow 
identifications. In Experiment 4, we investigate if the association of priming and source memory 
persists when the contribution from either recognition confidence judgements or the 
identification task is eliminated. 
Experiment 4 
In Lange et al. (2019) and Experiment 1, source memory judgments were preceded by 
recognition judgments. In Experiments 2 and 3, we eliminated overt and covert recognition 
judgments, leaving source memory judgments to be directly preceded by the identification task. 
Given the association of priming and source memory persisted when recognition ratings were 
absent, it is possible that the perceived speed of identification in the priming tasks directly 
preceding the source memory task could influence the manner in which priming and source 
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memory are related. As in some experiments in Lange et al. (2019), we therefore separated the 
identification task from the source memory task. While the perceived speed of identification is 
unlikely to affect the ‘correctness’ of a source decision, it could be responsible for the 
extremeness of the confidence rating (as seemed to be the case for identification and recognition 
ratings in Lange et al., 2019). To investigate this possibility, Experiment 4 repeated Experiment 
3, but measured identification RTs and source decisions in separate phases, rather than in an 
interleaved manner on each trial. 
Method 
Participants. 36 individuals (eight male; M age = 19.72, SD = 1.21) took part in the 
experiment for partial course credit. One participant was excluded for using their phone during 
the experiment. 
Materials. The materials were identical to previous experiments. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 3, bar one change. At test, the 
identification task and source memory rating task of the test phase were not interleaved. At the 
start of the test phase in each study-test block, participants first completed the identification task 
for all items. Following this, they gave source judgments on a six-point scale for all items. Here, 
on each source rating trial, the item was presented above the source rating scale in the center of 
the screen in Courier New font (i.e. the same font as used during the study phase). The remainder 
of instructions, procedure and number of items remained the same. 
Initial screening of identification trials. The number of valid trials was on average M = 
93.43 % (SD = 3.58, Min = 82.95) after excluding misidentified trials (M = 1.43%, SD = 0.59) 
and trials with identification RTs less than 200ms or greater than three standard deviations above 
mean identification RT (M = 1.43%, SD = 0.59). 
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Measures. Since only old items were presented at test, we cannot calculate an overall 
priming effect as a contrast of identification RT for old and new items. We report source 
memory as in previous experiments. 
Reliability of measures. Source memory, as measured by source d′, was reliable, r(33) = 
.90, p < .001, BF = 5.5 × 109. 
Results 
Source d′ exceeded chance (0), M source d′ = 0.81, SE = 0.13, t(34) = 6.33, p < .001, d = 
1.07, BF = 4.93 × 104. Table 1 shows the mean identification RT for old items, and also the 
mean hit rate and false alarm rate for source decisions. Source responding was not biased overall 
(source c = -0.01, SE = 0.02), t(34) = 0.56, p = .58, d = 0.09, BF = 0.21. 
Correct source decisions were associated with a faster identification than incorrect source 
decisions (M difference = 62 ms, SE = 22), t(34) = 2.80, p < .001, d = 0.47, BF = 5.00 (see the 
left-hand side of Figure 1D). This difference was consistent across individuals, being present in 
60% of participants. 
Second, we examined identification RTs for correct and incorrect source decisions across 
participants’ confidence. Five participants could not be included in this analysis because they had 
zero responses for particular cells of the analysis (hence N = 30 for this analysis).  Identification 
RTs tended to decrease (i.e., the priming effect was greater) as confidence in the source decision 
increased, as is shown in the right-hand side of Figure 1D, F(1.63, 47.40) = 15.97, MSE = 44788, 
p < .001, ηP
2
 = .36, BF = 6.42 × 10
4. Post-hoc analyses confirmed a significant linear trend, t(58) 
= 4.13, p < .001, though the quadratic trend was also significant (p < .001). Source decisions 
given a high confidence rating were associated with a faster identification than source decisions 
given a medium or low confidence, ps < .001, while there was no significant difference between 
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items given a low or medium confidence rating, p = 0.63, all comparisons Bonferroni-adjusted. 
There was no sufficient evidence for a main effect of source decision, F(1, 29) = 2.09, MSE = 
32788, p = .16, ηP
2 = .07, BF = 0.36, or a Source Confidence × Source Decision interaction, F(2, 
58) = 2.43, MSE = 29953, p  = .097, ηP
2 = .08, BF = 0.58. 
Discussion 
Overall, the results replicate previous experiments: correct source decisions are 
associated with more priming than incorrect source decisions, and priming increases as source 
confidence increases regardless of the source decision. However, in contrast to Experiment 3, 
which was identical to this experiment bar the separation of identification task and source 
memory judgements, all effects are considerably weaker. There is a simple explanation for this 
overall weaker association. Taking two measurements of the same memory signal at distinct time 
points (where different sources of noise and forgetting can affect the measures) results in a 
poorer measure than taking the two measurements concurrently. 
General Discussion 
In Lange et al. (2019), we argued that the same memory signal underlies responding in 
priming, recognition and source memory tasks, with a greater signal leading to higher 
performance in all three tasks. For the association of priming and source memory, a correct 
source decision (as a consequence of a greater memory signal, hence a greater source strength) 
was associated with faster identification in a priming task (as a consequence of a greater memory 
signal). While this association was graded, priming was associated with confident source 
judgments, regardless of whether they were correct (associated with high source strength) or 
incorrect (associated with low source strength). In order to account for this pattern in a formal 
signal detection model, we had to assume that source confidence ratings were not only driven by 
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source strength, but also influenced by the preceding recognition confidence rating. That is, that 
source confidence judgements were not made independently of recognition confidence 
judgments. In the present paper, we examined the theoretical assumption underlying this 
modelling choice empirically. 
After replicating the pattern of the association of priming and source memory 
(Experiment 1), removing overt and covert recognition ratings from the task (in Experiments 2 
and 3, respectively) did not change the nature of the association of priming and source memory. 
This suggests that it is not recognition ratings per se that are driving the observed association, 
even though allowing for decisional dependence between recognition and source ratings in the 
single system model of Lange et al. (2019) suggests this as the underlying process. However, in 
Experiments 2 and 3, source confidence judgments were not made in isolation: they were still 
preceded by the identification task. It is possible the particular decisional dependency of source 
on recognition ratings is merely one expression of a more generic fluency or decisional 
dependency mechanism. 
In Experiment 4, we therefore tested if the perceived speed of identification could have 
simply acted in lieu of recognition confidence ratings in Experiments 2 and 3. We separated 
identification and source memory task into different test blocks (i.e., trials were no longer 
interleaved), and indeed the association of priming and source memory weakened. This is in line 
with findings in Lange et al. (2019) where the association between priming and recognition 
weakened when this source of fluency was similarly eliminated. This is not to say that fluency 
did not affect source confidence judgments in Experiment 4. The pattern of the association still 
suggests that something other than source strength contributes to the source confidence 
judgments. It is possible, if unlikely, that participants are able to access their memory for the 
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speed of identification of individual items directly when coming to assess their confidence in 
their source decision. Alternatively, participants’ assessment of an item’s source strength may 
still be influenced by their assessment of an item’s strength overall. 
Overall our results suggest that implementing a dependency of source confidence 
judgments on recognition confidence judgments (e.g., Starns & Ksander, 2016) captures only 
one expression of decisional dependency between tasks. Across the work here and in Lange et al. 
(2019), we suggest that such dependencies are particularly present in interleaved memory tasks. 
Treating memory judgments in these tasks as decisionally independent, in formal modeling or 
when drawing inferences from the data, therefore ignores crucial mechanisms that contribute to 
the observed patterns of data. 
What does this mean for a single system model of memory? To be clear, our findings do 
not suggest that fluency alone, or even primarily, is sufficient to explain the associations between 
memory tasks. Even when this daisy-chain of decisional dependencies in a conjoint task such as 
ours is broken up by separating the tasks, the association of priming and source memory persists. 
It is clear that fluency, as perceived speed of identification, or the preceding judgment of 
memory strength can contribute to the source confidence judgements participants make. 
However, fluency cannot affect the source decision in favor of Source A or Source B and 
therefore cannot result in an accurate source decision; this can only be driven by source strength. 
Overall, the persistence of the association between priming and source memory is consistent with 
a single-system account of memory, where performance in different memory tasks is driven by 
the same memory strength signal as opposed to distinct, independent memory signals. 
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Table 2.  
Mean Number of Items with Correct and Incorrect Source Decisions Assigned Low-Medium-



















Mean Identification RTs for New and Old Items Across Experiments and Mean Hit and False 
Alarm Rates for the Source Memory Tasks 
 







  Hit False 
alarm 
d' 
Experiment 1         
  M 1942 2188 247   0.64 0.36 0.88 
  SE 62 77 34   0.02 0.02 0.15 
         
Experiment 2         
  M 2029 2277 248   0.65 0.35 0.88 
  SE 86 97 30   0.02 0.02 0.15 
         
Experiment 3         
  M 1930 - -   0.73 0.27 1.34 
  SE 82     0.02 0.02 0.15 
         
Experiment 4         
  M 1678 - -   0.65 0.35 0.81 
  SE 64     0.02 0.02 0.13 
         
 Correct source decision  Incorrect source decision 
 Low Medium High  Low Medium High 
Experiment 1 (N = 31) 
  M 27.26 31.10 48.45  25.26 26.45 11.03 
  SE 2.91 2.57 4.75  2.48 2.48 1.52 
        
Experiment 2 (N = 30) 
  M 30.90 25.83 51.37  28.63 19.17 11.17 
  SE 16.86 9.38 31.33  15.23 10.37 8.90 
        
Experiment 3 (N = 33) 
  M 21.67 25.58 78.54  18.39 16.42 9.33 
  SE 1.72 2.17 6.75  1.86 1.87 1.62 
        
Experiment 4 (N = 30) 
  M 28.00 29.03 49.83  26.87 20.57 9.80 
  SE 2.61 2.62 6.54  2.56 2.09 1.85 










Figure 1. Association of source confidence and identification RT in Experiment 1 (A), 
Experiment 2 (B), Experiment 3 (C), and Experiment 4 (D). Error bars indicate the 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
 
